Analysis · West Asia
How the Mecca Pact Changed Pakistan’s Place at the Iran Table
The Mecca pact made Pakistan a party to the Gulf’s war, and its mediation has adjusted accordingly, from Islamabad’s conference rooms to Field Marshal Munir’s visits to Tehran.

On October 31st Iranian negotiators sat down with Qatari mediators in Doha, a day after a Qatari team spent more than 12 hours in talks in Tehran. The document on the table was Qatar’s: a seven-day plan of daily confidence-building steps by America and Iran ahead of wider negotiations. A letter from JD Vance, America’s vice-president, had reached Tehran through Qatari intermediaries. When Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, set out his conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, he thanked “Qatar and Pakistan” in the same breath.
In April the first round of American-Iranian talks was held in Islamabad. On June 17th Pakistan brokered the Islamabad Memorandum, signed electronically by both presidents, which collapsed on July 8th. When talks resumed, Doha hosted a round that Pakistani and Qatari officials facilitated together. Until August, Pakistan came to every table with no forces committed to any side in the Gulf.
The Mecca pact changed that. Signed on August 7th by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, it treats an attack on one as an attack on all three. Within five weeks the Iran-backed Houthis struck an airbase at Khamis Mushait, wounding 73 people, and Islamabad carried Riyadh’s warning to Tehran. Khawaja Asif, Pakistan’s defence minister, said publicly that an “unprovoked aggression or spillover” into Saudi Arabia would make the agreement operational. A senior Iranian official replied that Iran “does not control the Houthis”. Two Iranian sources told Reuters that Tehran had urged the attacks. Houthi strikes have since killed at least 17 people in the kingdom.
On October 5th the pact’s committee, meeting in Riyadh, agreed to deploy Pakistani and Turkish forces for “rapid deployment in the Kingdom”. The day before, Iran’s foreign ministry had said it hoped reports of a Pakistani deployment were untrue, and warned that any new intervention would complicate matters. A country with forces committed to one side of a war cannot also host the other side’s peace talks.
Islamabad has divided the roles the pact had merged. Mr Asif describes Pakistani and Turkish forces in the kingdom as playing “a supporting role”, including reconnaissance, with Saudi forces doing the fighting. Ishaq Dar, the foreign minister, calls the pact “defensive in nature”, and says he raised it with Iranian leaders in New York in September, who urged political engagement with the Houthis. Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, set Pakistan’s limit at the UN General Assembly on September 25th: a Houthi attack on Mecca or Medina would cross it. The venue for American-Iranian talks moved to Doha, where no troops are committed to Saudi Arabia.
The pact then went to Tehran in person. On October 26th Prince Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s defence minister, led a delegation of the three signatories to meet Iranian officials, with Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, among them. It was the field marshal’s second visit to Tehran in October. Mohsen Rezaei, Iran’s national security chief, said afterwards that “West Asia’s security must be based on the countries of the region”. Two days later Mr Araghchi called the agreement to continue consultations with the pact’s members a “significant step”. In August Iran had met the pact with a call for Muslim unity. By late October it was negotiating with it as a bloc, and Pakistan’s army chief was at the table.
The division suits all four parties. Qatar gets the venue and the drafting. Iran gets a host with no forces deployed against its allies, and a direct line to the alliance it most needs to restrain. America keeps a mediator its officials have worked through for years. Pakistan keeps the channel that carries most weight in Tehran, the one between soldiers, and sits in it as a member of the pact. Pakistan’s military spokesman, Lieutenant-General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, has described himself as “cautiously optimistic” about the Doha track.
The arrangement holds while Pakistani forces stay in a defensive role and the Houthis leave Mr Sharif’s line untested. Javad Heiran-Nia, an analyst in Iran, told Al Jazeera that Tehran would tolerate a purely defensive deployment and treat offensive operations against the Houthis as a red line. Donald Trump held off strikes on Iran ahead of America’s midterm elections on November 3rd, and Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, says no decision has been taken on new ones. Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has ordered his armed forces to prepare an “immediate, impactful, and geographically unrestricted response” to any attack. An Iranian retaliation could reach Saudi Arabia, where Pakistani forces are now based, and the pact would then decide Pakistan’s next move for it.
Islamabad can take three steps, each at little cost. It can publish the defensive mandate of its forces in the kingdom: the mandate was agreed in Riyadh, so stating it costs nothing there and earns credibility in Tehran. It can keep the Tehran channel at army-chief level and leave the drafting to Doha. And it can state its support for the Qatari plan, so that each of Field Marshal Munir’s visits to Tehran is read as part of a single process. The next round will be held in Doha. The next message for Tehran will more likely travel in the army chief’s aircraft.
Bottom Line
The Mecca pact made Pakistan a party to the Gulf’s security, first as Riyadh’s messenger to Tehran in September, then as a contributor of forces in October. Pakistan has bounded its military role as defensive and supporting. Qatar now hosts the American-Iranian talks and holds the draft. Pakistan’s army chief has met Iranian officials twice in October, once as part of a pact delegation that Iran’s foreign minister has since called a “significant step”. Mr Araghchi has publicly credited both Qatar and Pakistan as mediators.
Unresolved
Pakistan has not disclosed the size or mission of its forces in Saudi Arabia, and Mr Asif declined on September 30th to say whether they had joined strikes in Yemen. Islamabad has not publicly endorsed Qatar’s seven-day plan. The content of the continuing consultations between Iran and the pact’s members has not been published. Reports that an American delegation will join the Doha talks remain unconfirmed by Washington, Tehran or Doha.
What To Watch
Mr Trump’s decision on strikes after the vote on November 3rd. Any Houthi attack on Saudi territory, and above all on the holy cities. The next round of consultations between Iran and the pact’s members, and whether it extends to the Houthis. Any Pakistani statement defining its forces’ mandate. Whether the Doha track moves to direct American-Iranian talks. The Pakistan Playbook will continue to report on each, starting with Field Marshal Munir’s next visit to Tehran.



