Analysis · West Asia

The Fall Guy for the Iran War Has Been Chosen

Eight months of regional diplomacy, two governments that keep undercutting it, and one vice president left holding the risk

Update, 13 November

After this piece was published, President Trump posted on 12 November that “We don’t need a deal with Iran” and that “those days have long since passed”. He directed Vice President Vance to give “his complete and total attention” to crime and corruption in Democrat-run cities and states. The Washington Post reported that the post ends Mr Vance’s dealmaking effort and leaves the naval blockade in place. It supersedes earlier reporting that Mr Vance was preparing to lead a new round.

In June, Mr Trump said that if the talks failed, “I’m blaming JD”. After the midterms, Mr Vance blamed the war for the Republican losses, and the president replied that “a lot of people didn’t like his comments”. On Thursday he took Mr Vance off Iran altogether. The Islamabad talks and the June memorandum stay on the vice president’s record, alongside his remark that the war cost the party the Senate. Any settlement the blockade forces out of Tehran will be announced from the Oval Office.

Qatar, backed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, had been discussing a technical meeting between American and Iranian experts. Earlier in the week, the president said that mediation was making progress. Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, says Washington also asked Vladimir Putin to broker direct talks. The White House has not said whether it did.

Washington no longer has a negotiator on Iran. The only text both governments have signed is the memorandum of 17 June.

On 21 June, at a resort above Lake Lucerne, JD Vance sat down with Iran's chief negotiators, with Pakistan's prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif, and Qatar's prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, in the room. The Islamabad Memorandum was four days old. That morning, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that the United States would "hit Iran very hard again, just like we did last week, only harder!!!" Iran's delegation protested that the threats breached Article 1 of the memorandum, which commits both sides to refrain from threatening force during negotiations. The mediators kept the talks going into the night.

Five months on, the pattern has a new chapter. The Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday that Mr Trump has been privately criticising the June memorandum Mr Vance helped negotiate, while authorising Mr Vance to lead the next attempt to end the war.

The arrangement serves the president. The war is in its ninth month and cost his party both chambers of Congress on 3 November. If the next round succeeds, the White House takes the peace. If it fails, the failure already has a name.

Heads I Win

The groundwork was laid in June, when Mr Trump joked: "If it doesn't work out, I'm blaming JD." After the midterms, Mr Vance wrote that "the reason we lost is the war." The president answered that "a lot of people didn't like his comments."

US officials told the Journal that becoming Washington's principal contact with Tehran carries significant political risk for the vice president, who could become the face of another failed round. The president keeps the war's record for himself. He has said he would fight it again, called it one of the best things his administration has done, and put its unpopularity down to "bad messaging". Marco Rubio and Stephen Miller back holding the blockade until Iran yields. The hard line stays in reserve whatever Mr Vance brings home.

Posting Through It

The war's diplomacy has suffered most from the man running it. On 10 April, as Mr Vance flew to Islamabad for the first face-to-face talks of the war, the president threatened Iran's leaders while the plane was in the air. On 9 June he said a deal could be done in two or three days. The next day he wrote that Iran had taken too long and would "pay the price". On 12 June, with a signing planned for Geneva, he dismissed Iran's account of the agreement as "weak and pathetic". The ceremony never happened; the memorandum was signed electronically five days later. A week after that he proposed American tolls on Hormuz for services rendered as the region's "Guardian Angel".

The complaint he now makes about the June agreement, that Iran used the pause to earn money, describes his own administration's choices. Iran shipped about 70 million barrels worth $5bn to $6bn while the blockade was lifted. The Treasury, meanwhile, waived sanctions on Iranian oil until 21 August, citing the progress of the talks.

The war's purpose has drifted with the posts. By the eve of the midterms the president was telling voters that Iran's nuclear programme had already been destroyed, which left the public to wonder what the fighting since then had been for.

The Second Strait

Iran's leadership has had no diplomatic relationship with Washington for more than four decades, and it negotiates like it. Its answer to every setback has been to widen the war through others.

The clearest case is Yemen. Within days of the American blockade returning on 14 July, the Houthis declared a maritime embargo on Saudi Arabia and positioned missiles and drones near the Bab al-Mandab, the strait at the mouth of the Red Sea. Traffic through it fell by a third in a day. In September they seized Mokha and the coast around the strait, which now lets them reach shipping with a much wider range of weapons, including artillery. A group that once fired at ships from Hudaydah, 250 kilometres away, can now do so from the water's edge.

Tehran describes the Houthis as an independent movement. The weapons tell a different story: American forces have intercepted Iranian shipments bound for Yemen, and UN investigators have documented the smuggling networks. A second chokepoint now threatens world trade alongside Hormuz, and it was built with Iranian help.

Neighbourhood Watch

The diplomacy that kept the war from widening further came from the region. The foreign ministers of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt first met as a group in Riyadh on 19 March, then in Islamabad on 29 March and Antalya on 18 April, each time backing Pakistan's mediation. That mediation produced the April ceasefire, the Islamabad talks and the June memorandum. After it was signed, the four ministers met again in Cairo to press for a permanent deal, with Qatar working alongside.

They have not stopped. On 23 October they met Britain, France and Germany in Istanbul to discuss Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandab and Yemen. On 26 October, Saudi Arabia's defence minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir and Turkey's intelligence chief, Ibrahim Kalin, flew to Tehran together to push for a deal. The same day, Egypt's parliament approved military support for Saudi Arabia against Houthi attacks. Qatar now leads the mediation, with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey in support.

Quiet, Please

The administration's cheapest concession would be silence. A threat posted while negotiators are in the room may cost nothing to send, and the mediators have spent the best part of a year repairing the damage afterwards. The talks would also benefit from one American voice: a vice president with the authority to negotiate is of little use if the president is renegotiating on Truth Social the same afternoon.

The next round will also need somewhere to start. The June memorandum remains the only text both governments have signed, and setting it aside would mean rebuilding from nothing. The cost falls on the president: working from the June agreement means accepting it was progress.

Bottom Line

Mr Trump is criticising the June agreement in private while authorising Mr Vance to try again, an arrangement that leaves the vice president holding the risk. The war has been prolonged by American statements that undercut the talks and by an Iranian leadership that answers pressure by extending the conflict through its allies, most dangerously in the Red Sea. Five regional governments, led first by Pakistan and now by Qatar, have carried the diplomacy throughout.

Unresolved

  • Whether Mohsen Rezaei, Iran's security chief, has agreed to meet Mr Vance; he has publicly denied any plan to.
  • Whether the president's private criticism of the memorandum becomes stated policy.
  • How far Iran directs Houthi operations at the Bab al-Mandab, as distinct from arming them.

What To Watch

  • The venue, date and mediators of any Vance-Rezaei meeting.
  • Houthi activity at the Bab al-Mandab and the deployment of Egyptian support to Saudi Arabia.
  • Moves in the new Democratic Congress to constrain the war.
  • The next joint visit to Tehran by the Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish delegations.

The Pakistan Playbook will continue to report on the Iran talks and the regional effort to end the war.

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